- Campuses :
- Twin Cities
- Crookston
- Duluth
- Morris
- Rochester
- Other Locations

mcps@umn.edu

612-625-6635

This semester the Foundations Interest Group will be reading Robert Hale and Aviv Hoffman's *Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology* (2010 Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN-13: 978-0199565818, ISBN-10: 0199565813 )

**January 18:** Organizational meeting

**January 25:** Chapter 1: Merely Possible Propositions, *Robert Stalnaker
*

We will read the new volume in the Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science on the mathematization of nature (a bit more historical than we've done in a while, which will be a good thing)

*The Language of Nature: Reassessing the Mathematization of Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century.* 2015. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Volume 20. Eds. Geoffrey Gorham, Benjamin Hill, Edward Slowik, and C. Kenneth Waters. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-language-of-nature**
September 8:** Semester organizational meeting

Carla Rita Palmerino

September 22:

Dana Jalobeanu

Richard Arthur

Roger Ariew

Daniel Garber

Douglas Jesseph

Eileen Reeves

Lesley Cormack

Kurt Smith

Justin H. E. Smith

Ursula Goldenbaum

Christopher Smeenk

**June 21**: Logan, Shay, “Relevance, Harmony and Abduction,” introduction with proposed readings.

Williamson, T. (2006) Must do better. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds),* Truth and Realism*. Oxford University Press, 278-92.

Williamson, T. (2015). *Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology. The Relevance of the Liar*, edited by B. Armour-Garb. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**June 28**: Williamson, T. (2013) *Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality. Erkenntnis* (S2): 1-21.

Priest, G. (2006) *Doubt truth to be a liar*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Chapter 7: Why It’s Irrational to Believe in Consistency)

**June 30**: Read, S. (2012) *Relevant Logic*. (This is the version on Read’s website, not the published version) Chapters 1–3.

**July 5**: Read, S. (2010). General-elimination harmony and the meaning of the logical constants. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 39 (5): 557–76.

Read, S. (2015). General-elimination harmony and higher-level rules. In *Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning* (pp. 293-312). Springer International Publishing

**July 7**: Read, S. (2000) Harmony and autonomy in classical logic.* Journal of Philosophical Logic* 29 (2): 123–154.

**July 12**: Logan, Shay, *Note on Harmony and Multiplicative Versus Additive Construction* (July, 2016). Nine pages.

Read, S. What is wrong with disjunctive syllogism?* Analysis*, Vol 41, No 2 (April 1981) pp. 66–70.

**July 14**: Mares, E. D. (2004).* Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–2.

**July 19**: Mares, E. D. (2004).* Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3–4.

Logan, Shay, *Relevant Logicians Don’t Reject Disjunctive Syllogism* three pages, July 17, 2016

**July 21:** Read, S. (2012) *Relevant Logic*. Chapters 4–5.

**July 26:** Read, S. (2012) *Relevant Logic*. Chapters 6–7.

**July 28:** Read, S. (2012) *Relevant Logic*. Chapters 8–9.

**August 2:** Mares, E. D. (2004).* Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 5–6.

**August 4:** Mares, E. D. (2004).* Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 10–11.

**January 21:** Semester organizational meeting

**January 28:** No meetng this week.

**February 4:** Al-Dhalimy, H., Cook, R.T. and Geyer, C.J .2016 (unpublidhed) "Surreal Numbers and Ultratasks"

**February 11:** Bueno, Otávio (manuscript) "Logic and Metaphysical Presuppositions"

**Otávio Bueno** (University of Miami) will be visiting.

**February 18:** Kouri, Teresa (manuscript) "Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective"

**February 25:** Berg, E.D. and Cook, R.T. (manuscript) "Does Frege have a Propositional Logic?"

**March 3:** Calasso, M. (manuscript) "The Philosophy of Arithmetic and Ontological Methodology: A Critique of Thomas Hofweber"

**March 10**: No meeting

**March 17**: No meeting

**March 24**: Cook, R.T. (manuscript)* Bad Company: An Essay on Neo-logicism* Chapter 2.

**March 31:** Cook, R.T. (manuscript)* Bad Company: An Essay on Neo-logicism* Chapter 3.

**April 7:** Cook, R.T. (manuscript)* Bad Company: An Essay on Neo-logicism* Chapter 4.

**April 14:** No Meeting

**April 21:** No Meeting

**April 28:** No Meeting

**May 5:** Cook, R.T. (manuscript) *Abstraction and Four Kinds of Invariance (Or: What's So Logical About Counting)*

**FIG is taking a break this semester, no meetings until the Spring 2016 semester**

We will be reading Greg Restall's book An Introduction to Substructural Logics

(Routledge 2000).

**June 16:** Chapter 2, Ifs, Ands and Ors

**June 25:** Chapter 3 Modalities

**July 2:** Chapter 3 Modalities

Meetinge are weekly as we progress through the book.

Michael Dummett's *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics*, Harvard University Press.1991.

**January 22**: Organizational meeting

**January 29**: Chapter 1 Semantic Values

**February 5**: Chapter 2 Inference and Truth

**February 12**: Chapter 3 Theories of Truth

**February 19**: Chapter 4 Meaning, Knowledge, and Understanding

**February 26**: Chapter 5 Ingredients of Meaning

**March 5**: Chapter 6 Truth and Meaning-Theories

**March 12**: Chapter 7 The Origin and Role of the Concept of Truth

**March 19**: No meeting Spring Break

**March 26**: Chapter 8 The Justification of Deduction

**April 2**: Chapter 9 Circularity, Consistency, and Harmony

**April 9**: Chapter 10 Holism

**April 16**: Chapter 11Proof-Theoretic Justifications of Logical Laws

**April 23**: Chapter 12 The Fundamental Assumption

**April 30**: Chapter 13 Stability

**May 7**: Chapter 14 Truth-Conditional Meaning-Theories

**May 14**: Chapter 15 Realism and the Theory of Meaning

**September 4**:Organizational meeting. Readings for this semester:

Essays from: *Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox*, J.C. Beall (ed.), Oxford University Press.

**September 11**: Roy T. Cook: Embracing revenge: on the indefinite extendibility of language

**September 18**: Meeting Canceled

Matti Eklund: The liar paradox, expressibility, and possible languages

**September 25**: Hartry Field: Solving the paradoxes, escaping revenge

**October 2**: Roy Sorensen (University of Washington, St Louis) will be visiting. Sorensen, R. unpublished paper "Other-centric Reasoning"

**October 9**: Thomas Hofweber: Validity, paradox, and the ideal of deductive logic

**October 16**: Tim Maudlon: Reducing revenge to discomfort

**October 23**: Douglas Patterson: Understanding the liar

**October 30**: Graham Priest: Revenge, Field, and ZF

**November 6**: Stephen Read: Bradwardine's revenge

**November 13**: Greg Restall: Curry's revenge: the costs of non-classical solutions to the paradoxes of self-reference

**November 20**: Kevin Scharp: Aletheic vengeance

**December 4**: Stewart Shapiro: Burali-Forti's revenge

**December 11**: Hellman, G. 2011. "On the significance of the Burali-Forti paradox" Analysis 71(4): 631-637. doi: 10.1093/analys/anr091

**December 18**: Cook, R. 2014. "Possible predicates and actual properties" Synthese DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0592-1.

**February 20**: Organizational meeting

**February 27**: Discussion of Solomon Feferman's article "Logic, Mathematics and Conceptual Structuralism" led by Geoffrey Hellman

**March 6**: Agustin Rayo (2013) "The Construction of Logical Space" (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Chapter 1, pp 3–34.

**March 13**: Shay Logan Work-In-Progress, among other things responding to Feferman's article

**March 20**: SPRING BREAK

**March 27**: Agustin Rayo (2013) "The Construction of Logical Space" (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Chapter 2, pp 35–72.

**April 3**: Peter Hanks Work-In-Progress

**April 10**: Sara Parhizgari Work-In-Progress

**April 17**: David Taylor Work-In-Progress

**April 23**: Richard Zach (University of Calgary) presentation

**May 1**: Marcus Rossberg (University of Connecticut) presentation

**May 8**: Haidar Al-Dhalimy Work-In-Progress

The first meeting of the semester will be Thursday, **September 5, 2013**. This meeting will set the readings for future meetings

This semester will be devoted primarily to discussing works in progress by FIG participants.

**September 12:** Roy Cook "Paradox without Concepts"

**September 19: **Haidar Al-Dhalimy "A Puzzle about Infinite Exchanges"

**September 26:** Charles Geyer "Mathematical Discovery and Invention"

**October 3: **Shay Logan "Mathematics: Left, Right and Center''

**October 10: **Charles Geyer. Reading: Leinster, T. 2012 "Rethinking Set Theory" arXiv:1212.6543v1

**October 17: **Geoffrey Hellman, 2007 "Structuralism" from Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic.

Bob Hale 1996 "Structuralism's Unpaid Epistemological Debts" Philosophia Mathematica 4(3) 124–147

**October 24: **Geoffrey Hellman. Reading: Burgess, J.P. "Putting Structuralism in its Place"

**October 31:**

**November 1:
November 8:**

Seriously

December 5:

In preparation for Chris Pincock's visit at the beginning of March we will be reading

"Mathematics and Scientific Representation" by Christopher Pincock (2012) NewYork: Oxford University Press

Christopher Pincock's Mathematics and Scientific Representation addresses problems in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science by examining the role that mathematics plays in scientific practice, scientific explanations, and scientific modelling, as well as by closely examining applications of mathematics to the natural world (i.e. 'applied mathematics'). The discussion is illustrated by a multitude of careful, historically sensitive case-studies of episodes where mathematics and mathematical representation played a central role in important scientific advances. Pincock argues that the role of mathematics in science is primarily epistemic, and he draws a number of conclusions regarding more traditional questions in the philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science based on this practice-oriented approach. The book, and our discussion of it, should be of interest to anyone working on either the philosophy of mathematics or the philosophy of science, broadly construed.

First meeting **January 24** organizational meeting

**January 30 Wednesday:** Chapters 1& 2: "Introduction" (pp. 3–24) & "Content & Confirmation" (pp. 25–44). This meeting has been moved to accommodate the Philosophy faculty search presentation.

**February 7:** Chapters 3 & 4: "Causes" (pp. 45–65) & "Varying Interpretation" (pp. 66–86)

**February 13:** Wednesday 2pm Chapter 5: "Scale Matters" (pp. 87–120)

**February 21:** Chapters 6 & 7: "Constitutive Frameworks" (pp. 121–140) & "Failures" (pp. 141–167)

**February 28:** Discussion with Chris Pincock.

**March 28:** Chapter 9: "Indispensibility" (pp. 190–202)

**April 4: **Chapter 10 "Explanation" (pp. 203–220)

**April 11:** Chapter 11: "The Rainbow" (pp. 221–242)

**April 18: **Chapter 12: "Fictionalism" (pp. 243–263)

**April 25:** Chapter 13: "Facades" (pp. 264–278)

**May 2:** Chapter 14: "Pure Mathematics" (pp. 279–300)

Discussions will center around Hartry Field's book.

Field, Hartry (2008), Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Note there will be an extra meeting of **Thursday, September 13.**

Thursday, September 13, 4 pm: 737 Heller Hall

Guest speaker

David Etlin, University of Groningen.

"Vague Desire: the Sorites and the Money Pump"

Abstract: The similarity between the sorites paradox of vagueness and the money pump of decision theory has been noted by Dummett (in "Wang's Paradox"), but the connection has not been widely recognized or developed. We argue that on one plausible philosophical theory of linguistic meaning, the Gricean intention based account (as developed in Schiffer's "Meaning"), the paradox of vagueness turn out to be a puzzle about intransitive preferences. Given this, one can solve the sorites paradox by diagnosing the appealing but mistaken principle connecting preference and choice leading to the money pump. We argue for a resolution of the money pump having consequences not only for diachronic principles of rational choice, but also the standard synchronic principle of rationalizable actions. Our approach to vagueness helps overcome worries about the arbitrariness of rejecting instances of the sorites step, and also supports a treatment of vague expressions that don't immediately lend themselves to soritical reasoning.

**September 10**: First meeting of the semester

**September 17:** Saul Kripke, "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975)

**September 24:** Robert Martin & Peter Woodruff, "On Representing `True-in-L' in L", Philosophia 5, (1975)

**October 1: **Hartry Field, Saving Truth From Paradox, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

**October 8:** Hartry Field, Saving Truth From Paradox, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

**October 15: **Hartry Field, Saving Truth From Paradox, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

To celebrate the 50th anniversary of the publication of Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* the group will take three weeks during the semester to explore how Kuhn’s ideas apply to different eras and areas of interest to the Foundations Interest Group.

All the Kuhnfest readings in one convenient place: here

**October 22 4:30 pm: **Kuhnfest event: The Crowe-Dauben Debate.

Main questions: Are there Kuhnian revolutions in mathematics? Given the radical changes in mathematics down the millennia, can one articulate a sense of "mathematics" or "the core of mathematics" in which mathematics (or its core) is cumulative?

Main readings (approx. 20 pages): Michael Crow "Ten 'laws' concerning patterns of change in the history of mathematics" (1975) and Joseph Dauben "Conceptual revolutions and the history of mathematics" (1984)

Supplemental readings for the curious: 1992 Postscripts, one by Crowe, one by Dauben, to their original papers

All the Kuhnfest readings in one convenient place: here

**October 29 4:30 pm:** Kuhnfest event: The Introduction and Justification of the Calculus

Main questions: Did the invention of the calculus constitute a revolution in mathematics? What changes in in mathematical concepts, standards of rigor, etc., did the invention of the calculus actually require (in either its Newtonian or Leibnizian form)?

Main reading (approx. 35 pages): Giulio Giorello, "The 'fine structure' of mathematical revolutions: metaphysics, legitimacy, and rigour. The case of the calculus from Newton to Berkeley and Maclaurin" (1992)

Supplemental reading for the curious: Eberhard Knobloch (2002) "Leibniz's Rigourous Foundation of Infinitesimal Geometry By Means of Riemannian Sums"

All the Kuhnfest readings in one convenient place: here

**November 12 4:30 pm**: Kuhnfest event: Intuitionism as a Potentially Revolutionary Development

Main questions: If intuitionism had become the dominant style of mathematics, would such a development have counted as a Kuhnian revolution in mathematics? Does intuitionism involve radical meaning change and the rejection of classical theorems?

Main reading (approx. 30 pages): Bruce Pourciau "Intuitionism as a (Failed) Kuhnian Revolution in Mathematics" (2000)

Supplemental reading for the curious: Hermann Weyl "On the New Foundational Crisis of Mathematics" (1921)

**November 19 **and following weeks to the end of the semster:

Hartry Field, Saving Truth From Paradox, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

FIG will meet on Thursdays at 3 pm during the summer.
We will be working through:

Bell, John (2008)* A Primer of Infinitesimal Analysis * 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

**June 7**:
Visitor **Philip Ebert** will be presenting his talk:

"*The Easy (Mathematical) Knowledge Problem*"

**June 28**:
preliminary tutorials on intuitionistic logic led by Roy Cook

Our first meeting of the semester will be on**
Monday January 23. **We will be reading: Corfield, D. (2006).

Meetings are held weekly.

**April 9**:* 4–6 pm1-149 Carlson School of Management*

**** Note change of venue****

**Professor Bob Hale** (University of Sheffield)

Abstract:

**Properties**

According to the* abundant* or *deflationary* conception of properties, every meaningful predicate stands for a property or relation, and it is sufficient for the *actual* existence of a property or relation that there* could *be a predicate with appropriate satisfaction conditions. In the first part of this talk, I shall argue that purely general properties and relations exist as a matter of (absolute) necessity. In the second, I shall draw out some implications of this conception of properties for the interpretation of higher-order logic. Some of these implications have an obvious bearing on Quine’s charge that higher-order logic is ‘set theory in sheep’s clothing’ and the ingredient charge that it involves ‘staggering existential assumptions’. If we agree that abundant conception’s sufficient condition is also necessary, this approach suggests a clean break between logic and the rest of mathematics. On this view, the so-called ‘standard semantics’ for second-order logic involves a false assimilation of logic to set theory. I shall conclude with some remarks about the implications of my view for the programme of providing a foundation for mathematical theories in higher-order logic plus abstraction principles.

The first meeting of the summer will be Thursday, May 26 at 2 pm.

We will continue reading Frege and discussing our schedule for the summer semester.

*The Foundations of Arithmetic*, **Gottlob Frege**, (J. L. Austin trans), Northwestern University Press, 1950.

In The Foundations of Arithmetic (Die Grundlagen der Arithmetic) Gottlob Frege outlines his logicism—the view that arithmetic (and, indeed, all of mathematics save geometry) can be reduced in a certain sense to logic. In addition to being a seminal text for contemporary philosophers of mathematics interested in modern variants of logicism (the so-called neo-logicists or abstractionists), this text has had an absolutely immense impact on the shape of 20th century philosophy of mathematics more generally.

Please contact Roy Cook for more details

The first meeting of the semester will be on
**Wednesday, September 8, 2010** at 3:30–5:00 pm in 737 Heller Hall.

Future meetings will be held every Thursday at 4:00 pm in 737 Heller Hall.

**Thursday, September 16**:
"The Nature and Meaning of Numbers" by Richard Dedekind Preface and sections I - V (pp. 31 - 67)

**September 30**:
"*Charles Parsons' Seminar on the History of Structuralism*" compiled and edited by Douglas Marshall (2003)

**November 11**: Michael Lynch "*Truth as one and Many*" Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009) Chapters 3 and 4. Michael Lynch will be attending this meeting.

**December 9**:
Chapter 1 of a probably never-to-be-finished book on IST. Perhaps the first day we should only read through Section 1.4, which gets to a natural stopping point, as the sentence by itself constitutes the first complete paragraph on p. 12 says. Section 1.5 gives the first applications to ordinary mathematics (real analysis and topology). Section 1.6 gives the philosophically and logically very important "Nelson's algorithm" for mechanically, formally translating external formulas to weakly equivalent internal formulas (as the first sentence of Sec. 1.6 explains). It is a great simplification and mechanization of NSA that is due to Nelson.

All of this is backed up by the paper Nelson (1977), but that may be too technical to read in its entirety. ( In particular the conservation theorem in the appendix (every internal statement that can be proved in IST can be proved in ZFC).)

**December 16**: Hellman, G. "On the significance of the Burali–Forte paradox"

"The Nature and Meaning of Numbers" by Richard Dedekind will be discussed on Thursdays where no other readings are listed. Contact Roy Cook for more details.

**June 14:** Set up meeting

**June 16: ** 'Structural Mathematics' see also http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2010/03/a_perspective_on_higher_catego.html

**June 18: **Professor Geoffrey Hellman presented a version of a talk he is to give in Paris.

**Mondays and Wednesdays:** Discussion of "Topoi: The Categorical Analysis of Logic" by Robert Goldblatt, (New York: Dover) 2006,
**ISBN-10:** 0486450260.

**Fridays **1:30 pm for as long as necessary: Discussion of papers or works in progress from the group

This semester we will be reading essays from *The Architecture of Modern Mathematics: Essays in History and Philosophy *edited by José Ferreirós & Jeremy J Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2003

**January 20**: Organizational Meeting

**January 27**: Ferreiros & Gray, "*Introduction*", pp.1 –43.

**February 3**: M. Beaney, "*Frege and the Role of Historical Elucidation: Methodology and Foundations of Mathematics*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 47–66.

**February 10**: J. Ferreiros, "*Reimann's Habilitationsvortrag at the Crossroads of Mathematics, Physics, and Philosophy*" in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 67–96.

**February 17**: J. Tappenden, "*The Reimannian Background to Frege's Philosophy*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 97–132.

**February 24**: L. Corry, "*Axiomatics, Empiricism, and Anschauung in Hilbert's Conception of Geometry: Between Arithmetic and General Relativity*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 133–156.

**March 3**: J. Avigad, "*Methodology and Metaphysics in the Development of Dedekind's Theory of Ideals*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 159–186.

**March 10**: C. McLarty, "*Emmy Noether's 'Set Theoretic' Topology: From Dedekind to the Rise of Functors*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 187–208.

**March 24**: P. Mancosu, "*Tarksi on Models and Logical Consequence*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 209–237.

**March 31**: J. Marquis, "*A Path to the Epistemology of Mathematics: Homotopy Theory*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 239–260.

**April 7**: M . Epple, "*Felix Hausdorff's Considered Empiricism*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 263–289.

**April 14**: E. Scholz, "*Practice-related Symbolic Realism in H. Weyl's Mature View of Mathematical Knowledge*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 291–309.

**April 21**: H Sinaceur, "*From Kant to Hilbert: French Philosophy of Concepts in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 311–337.

**April 28**: W. Seig, "*Relative Consistency and Accessible Domains*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 339–368.

**May 5**: J. Gray, "*Modern Mathematics as a Cultural Phenomenon*", in Ferreiros & Gray, pp. 371–396.

During the Fall 2009 semester, our main goal is to work through a number of articles on unrestrictedly general quantification and related topics (such as indefinite extensibility). All readings can be found in:

*Absolute Generality* edited by Agustin Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, New York: Oxford University Press 2006 ISBN 0199276439

The first Wednesday in November we shall take advantage of a visit by** Jeffrey Barrett** by reading his paper on “The Physical Possibility of Ordinal Computation” and discussing it with him.

The Wednesday before Thanksgiving, however, we shall take a short break from this topic in order to discuss *Logicomix*, a recent graphic novel portraying the life of Bertrand Russell.

**September 23**: “Introduction” to Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 1–19. The pdf is password protected. For access please contact mcps@umn.edu

**September 30**: “Relatively Unrestricted Quantification”, by Kit Fine, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 20–44.

**October 7**: “Context and Unresticted Quantification”, by Michael Glanzberg, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 45–74.

**October 14**: “Against ‘Absolutely Everything’!””, by Geoffrey Hellman, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 75–97.

**October 21**: “Sets, Properties, and Unrestricted Quantification”, by Oystein Linnebo, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 149–178.

**October 28**: “There’s a Rule for Everything”, by Vann McGee, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 179–202.

**November 4**: “On the Physical Possibility of Ordinal Computation”, **Jeff Barrett** (discussion to be led by Professor Barrett). The paper can be found online at: http://www.lps.uci.edu/barrett/papers.html

**November 11**: “The Problem of Absolute Universality”, by Charles Parsons, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 203–219.

**November 18**: “All Things Indefinitely Extensible”, by Stewart Shapiro & Crispin Wright, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 255 – 304.

**November 25**: *Logicomix*: *An Epic Search for Truth*, by Apostolos Doxiadis, Christos Papadimitroiu, et. al., New York: Bloomsbury USA 2009. ISBN 1596914521

**December 2**: “Unrestricted Unrestricted Quantification: The Cardinal Problem of Absolute Generality”, by Gabriel Uzquiano, in Rayo and Uzquiano 2006: 305 – 332.

**December 9**: “Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality” by Timothy Williamson, in Rayo & Uzquiano 2006: 369 – 390.

For more information, please contact Roy T. Cook or Janet McKernan.