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Cognitive Models of Science

Volume 15: Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements…xiii

Introduction: Cognitive Models of Science…xv
Ronald N. Giere

  1. Models from Cognitive Psychology …xvii
  2. Models from Artificial Intelligence ..…xxiii
  3. Models from Neuroscience .............…xxv
  4. Between Logic and Sociology ........…xxv
  5. Critique and Replies .......................…xxvii

PART I 
MODELS FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

How do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change in Science…3
Nancy J. Nersessian
The Scene 
The Question 
The Problem 
The Path to Solution

  1. What Is "Cognitive-Historical" Analysis?…4
  2. What Would a Cognitive Theory of Conceptual Change in
  3. Science Look Like?…7
    • 2.1 Background…7
    • 2.2 Outline of a Cognitive Theory of Conceptual Change…9
  4. Abstraction Techniques and Conceptual Change…13
    • 3.1 Analogical and Imagistic Reasoning…13
    • 3.2 Thought Experiments and Limiting Case Analysis…25
    • 3.3 Summary: Abstraction Techniques and Conceptual Change…34
  5. Wider Implications…35
    • 4.1 Implications for Philosophy of Science…35
    • 4.2 Implications for History of Science…36
    • 4.3 Implications for Psychology…38
    • 4.4 Implications for Science Education…39
  6. Return To Galloway…40
  7. The Scene…40
  8. The Problem…41

The Procedural Turn, or Why do Thought Experiments Work?…45
David Gooding

  1. Introduction …45
  2. Exemplary Science … 46
  3. Recovering Reconstruction … 48
    • 3.1 Reticularity and Reasoning …49
    • 3.2 Generation, Discovery, and Justification…51
    • 3.3 Recognizing Reconstruction …52
  4. The Procedural Turn .…52
    • 4.1 Cognitive Regress …53
    • 4.2 Discovery Paths…54
  5. Representing Experimental Paths…57
    • 5.1 Representing Objects…57
    • 5.2 Representing Agency …60
    • 5.3 Resources …60
  6. Experimental Reasoning …62
  7. Comparing Narratives …64
    • 7.1 Ontological Ambivalence .…65
    • 7.2 Thought Experiment s.…69
  8. Why Do Thought Experiments Work?…70

Serial and Parallel Processing in Scientific Discovery…77

Ryan D. Tweney

  1. Serial and Parallel Processing…77
  2. A Specific Case…80
  3. ECHO in the Dark…83
  4. Some Moral Lessons…86

The Origin of Everyday Concepts: Enrichment or Conceptual Change?…89
Susan Carey

  1. Local Incommensurability…92
    • 1.1 Mismatch of Referential Potential…92
    • 1.2 Beyond Reference…93
    • 1.3 Conceptual Differentiation…95
    • 1.4 Summary…98
  2. Five Reasons to Doubt Incommensurability between Children and Adults…98
    • 2.1 Adults and Young Children Communicate…99
    • 2.2 Developmental Psychologists Must Express Children's Beliefs=in the Adult Language; Otherwise, How is the Study of Cognitive Development Possible?…99
    • 2.3 Where Is the Body?…100
    • 2.4 How Would Incommensurability Arise? Empiricist Version…101
    • 2.5 How Would Incommensurability Arise? Nativist Version…101
  3. The Evidence…102
  4. Weight, Density, Matter, Material Kind…103
    • 4.1 Undifferentiated Concept: Weight/Density…103
    • 4.2 How an Undifferentiated Weight/Density Concept Functions…106
    • 4.3 The Material/Immaterial Distinction…107
    • 4.4 The Child's Material/Immaterial Distinction…109
    • 4.5 Weight and Materiality, Continued…114
    • 4.6 Occupation of Space by Physical Objects…115
    • 4.7 A Digression: An Undifferentiated Air/Nothing Concept…116
    • 4.8 Interim Conclusions: The Material/Immaterial Distinction…117
    • 4.9 Taking Up Space: Matter's Homogeneity…117
    • 4.10 Mathematical Prerequisites…122
  5. Conclusions…122
    • 5.1 Origins of Concepts…125

Conceptual Change Within and Across Ontological Categories:
Implications for Learning and Discovery in Science
…129
Michelene T.H. Chi

  1. Introduction…129
    • 1.1 The Nature of Ontological Categories…130
    • 1.2 Assertions of the Theory…133
  2. Conceptual Change across Ontological Categories…138
    • 2.1 Learning Science Concepts…139
    • 2.2 Processes of Radical Conceptual Change…141
    • 2.3 Discovering Science Concepts…144
    • 2.4 Similarity between Medieval Theories and Naive Conceptions:
      What Constitutes a "Theory"?…156
    • 2.5 Evidence of Radical Conceptual Change…161
    • 2.6 Fostering Radical Conceptual Change in the Context of Instruction…164
  3. Conceptual Change within an Ontological Category…167
    • 3.1 Revision of Part-Whole Relations…168
    • 3.2 Formation of New Superordinate or Subordinate Categories…171
    • 3.3. Reclassification of Existing Categories…172
    • 3.4 Spreading Associations in Insight Problems…174
    • 3.5 Direct Reassignment within Ontological Categories…176
    • 3.6 A Caveat…177
  4. Conclusion…178

Information, Observation, and Measurement from the Viewpoint of
a Cognitive Philosophy of Science
…187
Richard E. Grandy

  1. Scales of Measurement and Information…190
  2. Observation, Measurement, and Information…192
  3. Observation: From Sensations to Sentences…193
    • 3.1 Communitywide Stimulus Meaning…194
    • 3.2 Why Communitywide? …197
    • 3.3 Reliability…198
    • 3.4 Awareness of Observationality …200
  4. Kinds of Theoreticity …202
  5. A Program and a Conjecture…204

Foundationalism Naturalized…207
C. Wade Savage

  1. Foundationalist Theories of Conscious Knowledge…209
  2. A Foundationalist Theory of Conscious and Unconscious Knowledge…214
  3. The Knowing Organism as an Association…224
  4. Final Remarks…228

PART II MODELS FROM ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The Airplane and the Logic of Invention…239
Gary Bradshaw

  1. Introduction…239
  2. Why Did the Wright Brothers Invent the Airplane?…241
  3. Conclusions…249

Strategies for Anomaly Resolution…251
Lindley Darden

  1. Introduction…251
  2. Anomalies and Scientific Reasoning…252
  3. Previous Work on Anomalies…254
  4. Strategies for Anomaly Resolution…256
    • 4.1 Confirm Anomalous Data or Problem…257
    • 4.2 Localize the Anomaly…258
    • 4.3 Resolve the Anomaly…258
    • 4.4 Assess the Hypotheses to Resolve the Anomaly…261
    • 4.5 Unresolved Anomalies…262
  5. Representation and Implementation of Anomaly Resolution…263
    • 5.1 Representation of a Scientific Theory…263
    • 5.2 Anomaly Resolution: Localization…266
    • 5.3 Extensions to the Current Implementation…269
  6. Conclusion…270

Copernicus, Ptolemy, and Explanatory Coherence…274
Greg Nowak and Paul Thagard

  1. Explanatory Coherence…274
  2. Ptolemy and Copernicus…278
  3. Ptolemy: Evidence and Hypotheses…279
  4. Copernicus: Hypotheses and Explanations…287
  5. Running ECHO…291
  6. Is ECHO Necessary?…299
  7. Conclusion…300
    • Appendices: Input to ECHO for Simulation of Copernicus vs. Ptolemy …302
    • Appendix A: Evidence Propositions…302
    • Appendix B: Hypotheses in the Ptolemy-Copernicus Simulation…304
    • Appendix C: Explanations and Contradictions in the
    • Ptolemy-Copernicus Simulation…308

Understanding Scientific Controversies from a Computational Perspective: The Case of Latent Learning…310
Eric G. Freedman

  1. Latent-learning Study…312
  2. Explanatory Coherence by Harmany Optimization…315
  3. Results…319
  4. Discussion…329
    • Appendix: Inputs to ECHO.2 for the Simulation of the Latent-learning Controversy…333

PART III MODELS FROM NEUROSCIENCE

A Deeper Unity: Some Feyerabendian Themes in Neurocomputational Form…341
Paul M. Churchland

  1. Introduction…341
  2. Neural Nets: An Elementary Account…343
  3. Epistemological Issues in Neurocomputational Guise…353
    • 3.1 On the Theory Ladenness of All Perception…354
    • 3.2 On Displacing Folk Psychology…355
    • 3.3 On Incommensurable Alternatives…357
    • 3.4 On Proliferating Theories…358
    • 3.5 On Proliferating Methodologies…360
  4. Conclusion…362

PART IV BETWEEN LOGIC AND SOCIOLOGY

Philosophical and Sociological Uses of Psychologism in Science Studies: A Behavioral Psychology of Science…367
Arthur C. Houts and C. Keith Haddock

  1. The General Problem and the Psychologism Objection…368
    • 1.1 Philosophical Usages of Psychologism…369
    • 1.2 Summary and Conclusions about Philosophical Objections…374
    • 1.3 Sociological Usages of Psychologism…376
    • 1.4 Summary and Conclusions about Sociological Objections…382
  2. Epistemology from the Standpoint of Radical Behaviorism…384
    • 2.1 Radical Behaviorism Is Not Logical Behaviorism or Methodological Behaviorism…384
    • 2.2 An Answer to Subjectivist Psychology: Behavioral Analysis of Private Experience…388
    • 2.3 An Answer to Logical A Priorism: The Analysis of Rule-governed Behavior…390
    • 2.4 An Answer to "Cognitive Processes": Verbal Behavior Is Social Behavior…393
  3. Summary and Conclusions…395

Simulating Social Epistemology: Experimental and Computational Approaches …400
Michael E. Gorman

  1. Two Types of Validity…401
  2. Two Types of Experimental Research…402
    • 2.1 Experiments Using Abstract Tasks…402
    • 2.2 Experiments Using Scientific Problems…407
  3. Computational Simulation: An Alternate Approach…408
    • 3.1 Artificial Epistemology…409
    • 3.2 Comparing Experimental and Computational Simulations…411
    • 3.3 Do Computational Simualtions Refute SSK?…412
  4. Experimental Social Epistemology: Toward a Research Program…414
    • 4.1 Experimental Simulations of Error…414
    • 4.2 Minority Influence…415
    • 4.3 Knowledge Transmission…417
    • 4.4 Simulating a Scientific Controversy…419
  5. Conclusions…423

Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social…427
Steve Fuller

  1. The Scope of Social Epistemology…427
  2. Naturalizing Knowledge and Cognition: Momentum Lost and Regained…428
  3. Churchland and the Limits of Radical Naturalism…431
  4. The Limited Naturalism of Experimental Psychology…436
  5. The Limits of Naturalism in Analytic Epistemology…441
  6. The Limited Naturalism of Ethnomethodology…445
  7. Towards an Experimental Constructivist Sociology of Science…448

PART V CRITIQUE AND REPLIES

CRITIQUE

Invasion of the Mind Snatchers…465
Clark Glymour

REPLIES TO GLYMOUR

Reconceiving Cognition…475
Paul M. Churchland

What the Cognitive Study of Science is Not…481
Ronald N. Giere

Computing Coherence…485
Paul Thagard

Contributors…489

Author Index…493

Subject Index…501

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